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War by Committee: An Examination of Legislative 
War Powers 
Nicholas Creel, M.A., M.A., J.D., LL.M, Ph.D. 
 
Abstract: 
This paper will serve as an examination of the powers and 
limitations of the United States legislative branch of govern-
ment in matters of war.  In doing this, precedence will be 
given to specifically enumerated powers granted or withheld 
by the current Constitution of the United States.  Founding 
documents, such as the Articles of Confederation and early 
state constitutions will also be examined and contrasted with 
the current legal regime in an attempt to better understand the 
true meaning behind the Constitution.  International law, as it 
applies to American war powers, will also be examined when 
relevant. 
 
Statement of Facts 
The United States is a relatively young nation with its earliest 
claim to sovereignty reaching back to the Declaration of Independence 
in 1776.1  The first true constitution to govern the nation was known 
as the Articles of Confederation.2  Although the nation was governed 
under them for nearly a decade, the Articles of Confederation were 
widely considered to have been a foreign policy disaster.3  Problems 
of foreign policy principally arose from the fact that the Articles with-
held a great deal of power to the states, particularly in matters of inter-
national commerce.4  In fact, many states were known to have negoti-
ated independently with European powers for loans and commodities 
 
 1.  Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 2 (3rd ed. 2009).  
 2.  Id. at 4. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
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in direct competition with one another while they were governed under 
the Articles of Confederation.5  The independence of states in matters 
of international commerce meant the nation as a whole had no direct 
bargaining power with other nations as it could not enforce a unified 
trade policy.6   
However, in matters of war it must be conceded that states were 
not completely free to do as they pleased under the Articles of Confed-
eration.  Much like the current Constitution of the United States, indi-
vidual states could not unilaterally engage in war unless actually in-
vaded by a foreign power.7  In order for a war to be engaged in at all, 
nine of the thirteen states had to vote to make it so at the federal level 
of government.8  Also, under the Articles of Confederation states who 
contributed military forces to the “common defense” only had the 
power to appoint military officers under the rank of Colonel.9  This 
limitation left the appointment of high officers and thus the control of 
said forces to the federal government.10   
Lastly, the cost of any war was to be paid out of a common treas-
ury that was to be funded by a national property tax scheme to which 
states would voluntarily contribute.11  Obviously, with the tax being 
collected on a voluntary basis from state legislatures funding was 
chronically short for the federal government.12  This inability to raise 
funds was one of many Articles of Confederation failures to be directly 
addressed by the succeeding constitution.13   
For a myriad of reasons, the Articles of Confederation did not last 
and the United States adopted its current constitution as a replace-
ment.14  Nonetheless, one should still keep the Articles of Confedera-
tion in mind when examining the current constitutional framework of 
the United States as it provides unparalleled insight into the founders’ 
 
 5.  Id. at 3. 
 6.  Id. at 5. 
 7.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VI; U.S. CONST. art I § 10. 
 8.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX. 
 9.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VII. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VIII. 
 12.  Russell R. Sobel, IN DEFENSE OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND THE 
CONTRIBUTION MECHANISM AS A MEANS OF GOVERNMENT FINANCE: A GENERAL 
COMMENT OF THE LITERATURE, (1999). 
 13.  U.S. CONST. art I § 8. 
 14.  Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 2 (3rd ed. 2009).  
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beliefs of what did and what did not work at the federal level of gov-
ernment.15   
Also of relevance when interpreting the current Constitution is the 
American experience with the British Empire that left Americans both 
painfully aware of the potential tyranny that standing armies could 
bring and yet conscious of the practical necessities that war entailed.16  
Much as the current German Basic Law can only be understood in light 
of their confrontation with National Socialism, American constitu-
tional law must be examined with a close eye on that which served as 
an impetus to its inception.17  
Issues and Answer 
This paper will serve as an examination of the powers and limita-
tions of the United States legislative branch of government in matters 
of war.  In doing this, precedence will be given to specifically enumer-
ated powers granted or withheld by the current Constitution of the 
United States.  Founding documents, such as the Articles of Confeder-
ation and early state constitutions will also be examined and contrasted 
with the current legal regime in an attempt to better understand the true 
meaning behind the Constitution.  International law, as it applies to 
American war powers, will also be examined when relevant.   
Specific issues to be addressed include a broad examination of 
legislative powers in general, the funding powers of Congress, the 
powers Congress holds over militias and the power of Congress to is-
sue declarations of war.  From an international law perspective, the 
effect of the United Nations Charter on Congressional war powers will 
be given special attention.   
Main Discussion 
Legislative Powers Generally 
The legislative branch is created and regulated by Article I of the 
Constitution.18  It is important to keep in mind throughout our entire 
 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Charles L. Shanor & L. Lynn Hogue, NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY LAW  1 
(2003). 
 17.  Vicki Jackson & Mark Tushnet, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 123 (2nd ed. 
2006).  
 18.  U.S. CONST. art I. 
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examination of the legislature’s war powers that Article 1 Section 1 of 
the Constitution states that “All legislative powers herein granted shall 
be vested in a Congress of the United States.”19  The inclusion of the 
term “herein granted” plainly indicates that only powers that are spe-
cifically enumerated within the Constitution may be claimed by the 
legislative branch.20   
The obvious exception to this is of course found in the concluding 
statement of Article I Section 8 which states that Congress has the 
power “[t]o make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for car-
rying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested 
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof.”21  However, it is best to read the nec-
essary and proper clause as one that does not actually create any new 
Congressional powers in and of itself.22  One should instead read the 
necessary and proper clause as one that limits Congressional authority 
to act too far outside of the scope of its specifically enumerated pow-
ers.23   
Put another way, this clause proclaims that Congress may act out-
side of its enumerated powers only when Congress must do so in order 
to carry out said powers.24  If a law is enacted that does not directly 
effectuate an enumerated power then its enactment must be necessary 
to carry our said enumerated power or else it will be outside the scope 
of the legislature’s Constitutional authority and thus constitutionally 
void.25  Interpreting the necessary and proper clause any other way 
plainly contradicts the founders intentions of limited governmental 
power.26  
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution echoes this sentiment 
of limited federal governmental power when it states that “The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
 
 19.  U.S. CONST. art I § 1. 
 20.  John Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1684 (2002). 
 21.  U.S. CONST. art I § 8. 
 22.  David E Engdah,  The Necessary and Proper Clause As an Intrinsic Restraint on Fed-
eral Lawmaking  22 Power. Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y  1: 107 (1998). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
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people.”27  As an Amendment to the Constitution, the Tenth Amend-
ment is considered “valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this 
Constitution” and should therefore be read as carrying a legal weight 
that is equal to the rest of the document.28   
The Tenth Amendment accomplishes much the same task as the 
term “herein granted” in Article 1 Section 1, but it does so much more 
forcefully.29  The Amendment does this by first using the term “not 
delegated.”30  The term “not delegated” assumes that the federal gov-
ernment has only those powers it was specifically assigned.31  Sec-
ondly, the Amendment then uses the term “reserved” which signifies 
that only that which has been explicitly surrendered to the federal gov-
ernment by the state is lost to the state and all other power is retained 
by it.32   
Taken as a whole the Constitution plainly reads in such a way that 
it begs one to interpret it strictly, giving power to the federal govern-
ment only when it is obvious that said power was meant to be given.  
Keeping this in mind as further Constitutional provisions and laws are 
interpreted will most likely lead one to a result intended by the framers 
of the Constitution. 
The Funding Provisions 
In Article 1 Section 8 we are given a list of specifically enumer-
ated Congressional powers.33  The first war related power mentioned 
in Article 1 Section 8 relates to the power of Congress to collect taxes 
to “provide for the common defense.”34  Congress is also given the 
power “To borrow money on the credit of the United States.”35  These 
are not powers that ought to be dismissed as ineffectual as they encap-
sulate the sole ability of the federal government to finance a war.36   
 
 27.  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 28.  U.S. CONST. art V. 
 29.  U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
 30.  Alden v. Maine: Infusing Tenth Amendment and General Federalism Principles Into 
Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 505 (2001).  
 31.  Id.  
 32.  U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
 33.  U.S. CONST. art I § 8. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Yoo, supra note 20. 
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When one remembers the nation’s experience with the ineffectual 
Articles of Confederation and its voluntary tax contribution model, 
these new constitutional provisions that allow direct taxation and bor-
rowing are seen as a purposeful remedy to a recognized failure of the 
nation’s previous constitution.37  It is little wonder that this direct tax-
ation provision was adopted when one considers that under the Articles 
of Confederation the federal government received on average only half 
of what it requested form the states.38  The founders saw a mistake in 
the old system and moved to correct it in the new. 
The power of Congress to fund the military under the current Con-
stitution is not absolute as it is later qualified further down in Article I, 
Section 8 by the explicit limitation that no financial support of the mil-
itary  “shall be for a longer term than two years.”39  This limitation is 
in fact a provision that empowers rather than inhibits Congressional 
war power as it ensures that the military will forever be dependent on 
Congress for funding.40  Due to this limitation, a military campaign 
cannot be legislatively approved and then carried out by the executive 
in perpetuity without further Congressional action on at the very least 
a biennial basis.41   
This model of empowering the legislative branch with the power 
of the purse is directly copied from the British political system, the 
system from which America was born.42  Outside of this two year lim-
itation, Congress is explicitly given complete power of the purse. In 
other words, only Congress can raise funds and only it can appropriate 
said funds to the military.43  Should Congress decide to tighten the 
purse strings to the military it would completely eliminate the ability 
of the nation to go to war.44  This power should be seen as an opera-
tional, or a functional veto, over the nation’s ability to wage war.45  
What’s more is that Congress does not even hold a vote to exercise this 
 
 37.  R. Sobel, IN DEFENSE OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND THE CONTRIBUTION 
MECHANISM AS A MEANS OF GOVERNMENT FINANCE: A GENERAL COMMENT OF THE 
LITERATURE. (1999).  
 38.  Id. 
 39.  U.S. CONST. art I § 8. 
 40.  Paul Yingling, The Founders’ Wisdom, Armed Forces J., Feb. 2010. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Yoo, supra note 20. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
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functional veto over war making. Instead, it may simply fail to appro-
priate funds and the matter will be settled.  Without active Congres-
sional involvement, the military simply cannot function.46 
The Militia Provisions 
The next legislative war powers to be discussed are the provisions 
which relate to the militia.  In what I will term the first militia provi-
sion, Congress is explicitly given the power “to provide for calling 
forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections 
and repel invasions.”47  In the second militia provision, Congress is 
empowered:  
[T]o provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the mi-
litia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed 
in the service of the United States, reserving to the states re-
spectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority 
of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed 
by Congress.48   
These powers serve a dual function that can be best understood in 
a historical context that is unique to the United States.49  In particular, 
one will find it helpful to review state constitutions that were in effect 
before and during the Articles of Confederation in order to get a better 
idea of what these provisions truly set out to accomplish.50 
The most significant accomplishment of these militia provisions 
was that they transferred what was traditionally state authority over the 
militia to the federal government.51  Specifically, the provisions trans-
ferred authority over state militias to the federal legislature.52  The use 
of the word “reserving” in the second militia provision of Article 1, 
Section 8 is evidence of this power transfer as the word reserve has, 
since its inception, meant to hold back and only that which was 
 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  U.S. CONST. art I § 8. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understand-
ing of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 254 (1996). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
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previously present may be held back or “reserved.”53  The legislative 
powers to “call forth the militia” and to organize, arm,  discipline and 
govern “such part of them as may be employed in the service of the 
United States” were all powers once held by states.54  Even a cursory 
glance at state constitutions of the time provide ample evidence of 
this.55 
Recall also that under the Articles of Confederation, states only 
had the power to appoint military officers under the rank of Colonel 
when forces were raised for the common defense.56  The Articles were 
not referring to a militia in this provision but instead to an assembled 
national military force to which states could voluntarily contribute 
troops towards.57  Under the Articles of Confederation the militia was 
understood to be a force that was erected for state defense, not the com-
mon defense, and thus it remained under state domain.   
As previously stated, the state constitutions at the time provide 
support for this assertion.58  For example, the Constitution of New 
Hampshire that was written in 1776 specifically creates state level pro-
cedures for nominating militia officers without any mention of federal 
rank limitations.59  The 1776 Constitution of South Carolina carries 
similar language regarding militia officer appointment.60  The 1776 
Constitution of New Jersey also provides for state level procedures in 
militia officer nomination.61  Pennsylvania, Georgia, New York, and 
Vermont also all have provisions that speak to the state’s ability to ap-
point all officer posts in their respective militias.62  Delaware’s first 
constitution does not mention anything about a militia but it does state 
that the “general assembly shall appoint the generals and field-officers, 
and all other officers in the army or navy of this state,” which goes to 
 
 53.  DICTIONARY DEFINITION OF RESERVE, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/reserve. 
 54.  Yoo, supra note 49, at 254. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VII. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Yoo, supra note 49. 
 59.  N.H. CONST.  
 60.  S. C. CONST. art. XXIII, XXIV. 
 61.  N.J. CONST. art. X. 
 62.  62. PA. CONST. § V (1777), GA. CONST. art. XXXIV (1777), N.Y CONST. art. XXIV 
(1777), VT. CONST. art. XLII (1777). 
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show just how independent states saw themselves at this point in his-
tory.63   
The notion of state authority over the militia then, prior to the cur-
rent Constitution, was universal.64 Therefore, in the second militia pro-
vision we see ample evidence that the federal government is, under the 
new Constitution, encroaching on what was previously a state power 
and that from this moment on states were to keep (or reserve) only a 
fraction of the authority they once enjoyed over the militia.  Another 
driving force behind the first militia provision was the founders’ desire 
to create a bulwark against a potentially tyrannical President, who 
would call forth a standing militia in place of raising his own army.65  
As mentioned, Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the sole ability to 
“raise” armies.66   
This fear is further justified when we look once again to state con-
stitutions that were in effect at the time.  In many states the executive 
branch was given direct power over the state militia. In particular, the 
constitutions of New Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, South Caro-
lina, Georgia, Vermont and New York all placed the executive as the 
commander-in-chief of the state militia.67 Familiar with their own state 
constitutions, the founders preemptively took away the possibility of a 
President being able to argue that he had inherent executive authority 
over the militia without the legislature first allowing it to do so.68  The 
founders emphasize this point in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitu-
tion when they establish that the President is Commander-in Chief of 
the militia “when called into the actual Service of the United States.”69 
Unless Congress explicitly gives the President the power to control the 
militia, he has no authority over them.70 
 
 63.  DEL. CONST. art. 16 (1777). 
 64.  Yoo, supra note 49. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  U.S. CONST. art I § 8. 
 67.  N.J. CONST. art. VII.; DEL. CONST. art. IX.; N.C. CONST. art. XVIII.; S.C. CONST. art. 
XI.; GA. CONST. art. XXXIII.; VT. CONST. ch. 2 § 3.; N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII. 
 68. Yoo, supra note 49, at 254. 
 69. U.S. CONST., art II, § 2. 
 70.  Yoo, supra note 49, at 176. 
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Declarations of War 
Article 1, Section 8 gives Congress the power to “declare war.”71  
This term is as ambiguous today as it was when first written.72  In draft-
ing the Constitution, a great deal of controversy surrounded the word-
ing of this provision.73  The drafters were divided on what verb to use 
before the word “war” in this clause.74  The surviving accounts of the 
drafting process illustrate that the nation’s founders were keenly aware 
of the monumental difference that particular words would make.75   
At the center of the debate was the question of whether the Con-
stitution should give the legislature the sole ability to determine when 
the nation would go to war or whether that power should be more 
evenly shared among the political branches.76  Roger Sherman, a 
drafter from Connecticut, was an avid proponent of using the verb 
“make” instead of “declare.”77 Sherman understood that using the term 
“declare” would greatly lessen legislative power in matters of war as 
the term “declare war” had a very specific meaning at the time.78  In 
the end Mr. Sherman lost his battle and the verb declare won the day.79  
Even after establishing that the term “declare war” is not as expansive 
as the term “make war,” we are still unclear about what the term “de-
clare war” actually means.80   
The founders’ debates on which term to use are helpful because 
they demonstrate that the writers of the Constitution were keenly aware 
of the differences that a single word could make.81  Their debates pro-
vide evidence of the deliberate use of every word in the document that 
governs our nation.82  Proponents of an expansive legislative war pow-
ers shrink from the fact that such debates over terminology were 
 
 71.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. 
 72.  Francis D. Wormuth & Edwin B. Firmage, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR:  THE WAR 
POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 18 (1987). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs: What the Constitution Means by “Declare 
War”, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 45-45 (2007). 
 81.  Wormuth, supra note 72, at 18. 
 82.  Id. 
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important and instead rely on un-authoritative private writings from 
founders such as Thomas Jefferson, who were supposedly of the view 
that “declare war” meant that only Congress and not the President 
could unilaterally bring the nation into war.83   
To support this view, Jefferson is often quoted as saying, “We 
have already given in example one effectual check to the Dog of War 
by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to 
the Legislative body.”84  I do not dare argue that Jefferson is wrong.  In 
fact, I believe Jefferson is absolutely correct in his assessment of war 
powers in the United States.85  However, there is no evidence to sup-
port that in this statement Jefferson was referring to Congress’s power 
to declare war.  It is my contention Jefferson’s quote was not referring 
to the power to declare war; rather he was more likely speaking to Con-
gress’s ability to “raise and support armies” and the congressional 
power of the purse.86   
Legal scholars who support an expansive reading of the “declare 
war” provision such as Michael Ramsey and Saikrishna Prakash lift 
only a limited, out of context, portion of Jefferson’s letter to James 
Madison to support their personal agenda.87  If one refers directly to 
the source, one can plainly see that this statement is made in a discus-
sion of the checks-and -balances between the executive power of the 
sword and the legislative power of the purse.88  In fact, the quote as a 
whole reads: “We have already given, in example one effectual check 
to the Dog of war, by transferring the power of letting him loose from 
the executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to 
those who are to pay.”89   
Legislative war power proponents fail to even present the com-
pleted thought of Jefferson because doing so would severely under-
mine their argument.  Rather than relying on private and out of context 
statements from the founders in order to interpret the legislature’s Con-
stitutional war powers one should focus more heavily on what was 
 
 83. Prakash, supra note 80, at 45-46. 
 84.  Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, U. of Chi L. Rev. 1543, 1549 (2002). 
 85.  Id. 
 86. 8 U.S. CONST. art. 1 §8. 
 87.  Ramsey, supra note 84, at 1549-53. 
 88.  Thomas Jefferson, The Earth Belongs to the Living:  To James Madison September 6, 
1789, THE LETTERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1743-1826. 
 89.  Id. 
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actually said in official documents such as the current Constitution, the 
Articles of Confederation and state constitutions that were in effect 
during the founding era of the nation.90   
In the Articles of Confederation, the word war is used a total of 
ten times, four of which are in regards to “vessels of war” and can 
therefore be disregarded as irrelevant to the current discussion.91  In the 
current Constitution, the word war is only mentioned four times, one 
of which is in regards to “ships of war.”92  Between both documents 
we have nine potentially useful instances where the word war is used.93  
By examining the preceding words to war in each document we can 
perhaps elucidate exactly what is meant by “declare war” in Article I 
Section 8 of the Constitution.  
In each of these documents, we find the most striking contrast be-
tween the phrases “declare war” and “engaging in war.”94  In Article I, 
Section 10 of the Constitution individual states are prohibited from 
“engaging in war.”95  The term “engage in war” is present in the Article 
of Confederation as well in two separate Articles.96  In one of these 
articles, states are explicitly disallowed to “engage in war.”97 It is safe 
to say that the term “engaging/engage in war” is used to accomplish 
the same goal in both constitutions.  In both instances the term prohib-
its states from engaging in war unless specific circumstances exist.98   
The term also arises in the Articles of Confederation is when the 
document decrees that the nation as a whole will not “engage in war” 
unless a majority vote from the states allows it to do so.99  When ex-
amining the term in both constitutions we see that the verb engage was 
commonly used as a way to strictly prohibit all war.100  This suggests 
that if the founders wished to prohibit the executive form bringing the 
 
 90.  Yoo, supra note 20, at 1543. 
 91.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VI, VIII and IX. 
 92.  U.S. CONST., art. I, §8, 10; id. art. III, § 3. 
 93.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VI, VIII and IX; U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, 10; 
id. art. III, § 3. 
 94.  Yoo, supra note 20, at 1639. 
 95.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10. 
 96.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VI and IX. 
 97.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VI. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 6. 
 100.  Yoo, supra note 20, at 1648. 
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nation into hostilities without legislative approval that  they were very 
familiar with how to do so.101   
Instead of using the ambiguous declare war provision in Article I, 
the founders could have easily inserted an unambiguous clause that 
stated, “The nation will not engage in war without the approval of the 
legislature.”102  However, the founders did not do this.  Considering 
their familiarity with creating legislative checks on executive power, 
the founders rationally intended the term “declare war” not be given a 
special meaning in order to grow legislative power nearly two centu-
ries after it was written.103  What then does declare war actually mean?  
Perhaps international law holds an answer. 
One cannot dismiss international law as irrelevant to our domestic 
law. Although many may not realize it, international law plays an im-
portant role in our Constitution.104  For example,  the Supremacy 
Clause states that the “Constitution . . . and all treaties made, or which 
shall be made . . . shall be the supreme law of the land.”105  Treaties, 
much like regular laws, do not take precedence over the Constitution 
but they can in some instances trump federal and state laws.106  Also of 
relevance to international law, Article I,  Section 8 of the Constitution, 
empowers Congress to “define and punish . . . offences against the law 
of nations.”107  The law of nations is known today as customary inter-
national law.108  In these two articles we see that at the very least the 
founders were familiar with international law and created constitu-
tional provisions that dealt with international law’s implications on do-
mestic law.109   
Declarations of war held a very specific meaning under interna-
tional law at the time of the founding.110  Up until the early 20th Cen-
tury, war was considered a legitimate state activity that was recognized 
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and regulated under international law.111  Declarations of war were in 
a sense notifications that formally changed legal standing between par-
ties.112  Not only did a declaration of war change the legal relationship 
between two warring states, it enacted the laws pertaining to states that 
were neutral to the conflict as well.113  With such a particular meaning 
under international law and the incorporation of constitutional provi-
sions that plainly indicate a familiarity with it one is hard pressed to 
seriously argue that the term “declare war” in the Constitution holds a 
different meaning than what it did under international law at the time 
of the founding.   
As international law has developed over the past few centuries, 
Congress’s power to issue a declaration of war has more or less been 
rendered functionally obsolete.114  The UN Charter, which currently 
acts as the supreme legal source of international law, has in effect re-
lieved Congress of its power to declare war.115  War itself may still be 
legal under international law so long as it is carried out in compliance 
with certain provisions of the UN Charter. War is no longer governed 
by the same principles of customary international law as it was when 
the Constitution was written.116  When one considers that the declara-
tion of war power was written into the Constitution so as to allow Con-
gress to legally “perfect” war under international law we see that the 
provision has today become functionally obsolescent.117  With interna-
tional law changing the rules of the game, the declare war provision no 
longer has any legal utility in the international setting. 
The War Powers Resolution 
Within the current legal framework, we are told that our current 
“Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made 
in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the land.”118  How-
ever, the Constitution does not explicitly specify which (law or 
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constitutional provision) is to be disregarded when the two conflicts.  
Luckily, this matter was resolved early on in our history in Marbury v. 
Madison. The Supreme Court eloquently stated that, “If a law be in 
opposition to the Constitution . . . the Constitution, and not such ordi-
nary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.”119  This ruling 
makes sense when one considers Article 5 of the Constitution, which 
covers the procedure to amend said document.120  If a mere act of Con-
gress could amend the Constitution, Article 5 would be superfluous. 
The War Powers Resolution (WPR) is a legislative act that was 
passed in 1973 only after achieving the necessary supermajority ma-
jority vote to override President Nixon’s veto.121  The stated purpose 
of the WPR was to ensure Congress and the President shared in the 
decision-making process of whenever the United States would become 
involved in hostilities.122  Upon reading the WPR however, it is clear 
that the Resolution was a congressional attempt to firmly establish the 
roles of both the Legislature and the Executive in matters of war.123   
It is also important to understand the historical context from which 
the WPR was developed.  The United States had been in the unpopular 
Vietnam War for years, and many saw this Resolution as a direct re-
sponse to that particular war.124  The animosity between the two polit-
ical branches was palpable at the time and this Resolution’s passage 
was for many a formal rebuke to the President.125  When examining the 
WPR, one must keep in mind that it is only an act of Congress, a mere 
law, and that if it conflicts with the Constitution, said law has no force 
or effect.126 
The WPR is divided into nine sections, the first section merely 
naming the act the “War Powers Resolution.”127  The second section 
sets out what Congress declares to be the purpose of the act, “to fulfill 
the intent of the framers of the Constitution,” by ensuring that the 
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President and the Congress must consult with one another before in-
troducing American armed forces into hostilities.128  Next, in Section 
2, the act recites the Necessary and Proper clause from Article I, Sec-
tion 8 of the Constitution in an attempt to assert the authority of the 
legislature to make such a law.129  Lastly, in Section 2, the Congress 
attempts to define the Presidents Commander-in-Chief powers by stat-
ing that said powers only become activated when a declaration of war 
is issued, specific statutory authorization deems them active, or when 
an emergency exists and was created by an attack.130  
According to Section 1543, the President must consult with Con-
gress before introducing The United States Armed Forces into hostili-
ties. After introducing the military, the President must regularly con-
sult with Congress over the matter until the armed forces are removed 
from hostilities.131  Section 1543 requires the President to adhere to a 
reporting requirement when the nation is in hostilities without a decla-
ration of war.132  Section 1544 describes who in Congress must receive 
the reports discussed in Section 1543. Further, Section 1544 limits the 
President’s ability to use armed force abroad.133  Specifically, the Act 
requires that the President withdraw armed forces from hostilities after 
sixty days unless he receives Congressional authorization to con-
tinue.134  The President may receive the maximum of a thirty day ex-
tension but only if said extension will result in the prompt removal of 
forces form hostilities.135   
Sections 1545-1546a describe the relevant procedures for passing 
joint and concurrent resolutions.136  Section 1547 provides that the 
Congressional authority to commence or continue hostilities cannot be 
inferred from an appropriation act or a ratified treaty.137  Finally, Sec-
tion 1548 addresses how to deal with potential litigation under the act 
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by noting the “separability” of the provisions. When one provision is 
nullified, all remaining provisions remain in force.138 
President Nixon’s veto to the WPR was unsurprising, and in a let-
ter to Congress he stated his objections to the act.139  His principle ob-
jections related to the constitutionality of the act.140 The President es-
pecially took issue the provision that gave Congress what is essentially 
a legislative veto over the use of force and empowered them to direct 
the withdraw of troops.141  The constitutionality of the sixty day man-
datory withdraw requirement was also questioned as it allowed Con-
gress to place a check on Presidential power without any affirmative 
action required by the Congress.142   
Subsequently, President Nixon urged that the act undermined for-
eign policy because it impacted the President’s ability to conduct for-
eign affairs effectively.143  However, Nixon did not state that the act 
was entirely unconstitutional.144  He praised the Act’s intent to promote 
cooperation between the political branches and he embraced Section 
1542  entirely.145  Ever since the WPR was enacted, every President 
has deemed the Act an unconstitutional infringement on the Presi-
dent’s executive powers.146 
Conclusion 
The inability to wage war effectively under the Articles of Con-
federation stemmed less from state retention of power and more from 
the inability of the federal government to produce effective national 
leadership.  Under the Articles of Confederation, the United States was 
governed without an executive branch and had a legislative body that 
is best described as a neutered parliament which lacked even the lead-
ership of a prime minister.147  The current Constitution was developed 
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in light of the failures of the Articles of Confederation with an eye 
toward remedying those issues without creating a state that could be 
easily gripped by tyranny. The result that was a Constitution that em-
braced was what is known as a system of “checks and balances.”148   
Many have begun to fear that our system of checks and balances 
is in danger of becoming nothing more than a historical memory.149  In 
particular, there is a fear that the President may unilaterally send the 
nation into war without any Congressional involvement.150  This is a 
fear that is mightily overblown considering the extraordinarily power-
ful  legislative checks on the executive branch.151  Without Congres-
sional approval, the President cannot raise or borrow funds to sustain 
a military campaign.152   
Although Congressmen may complain that it is politically costly 
to not vote on a bill that will fund the military, we must not confuse a 
lack of political will with political incapacity.153  One must remember 
that at our founding the idea of maintaining a standing military was 
extremely unpopular.154  Congress, the only governmental body capa-
ble of raising and supporting a military has forgotten this sentiment 
and allowed the nation to maintain a vast military machine. 155   
One must also realize that the United States is not the fledgling 
nation it was at its founding; it has become a global hegemon with 
military commitments throughout the world.  Should the legislature 
truly wish to remove the nation from the possibility of the military be-
ing utilized all it need do is vote accordingly when awarding appropri-
ations.156  Fear of losing re-election is not a justifiable excuse for Con-
gressmen to complain that they have no check on executive war 
making ability.157  Should Congress truly feel they need a further check 
on the executive they ought to seek an amendment to the Constitution 
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rather than pass resolutions that seek to alter Constitutional powers of 
the government.   
The argument to read the declare war provision of the Constitution 
as one which greatly empowers Congress is not only mistaken but dan-
gerous.158  Commanding checks against the executive’s power to use 
the military are already in place and need not be added to.159  Reading 
the declare war provision too broadly risks forcing the nation to wage 
war by committee, a mistake the founders sought to correct as they 
abandoned the ineffectual Articles of Confederation.  Taken as a 
whole, it seems best to read “declare war” as something far less than 
an outright prohibition of the use of force by the executive.160   
It is likely noticeable that throughout this discussion little mention 
was made of the judicial branch.  This is because the judicial branch 
receives its powers form Article III of the Constitution and in Article 
III the only mention of war comes in the form of defining the crime of 
treason as “levying war” against the nation.161  The judicial branch has 
no power in matters of war, as war is ultimately a political act.162  Be-
cause of war’s political nature, courts have been hesitant to even ad-
dress the legal squabbling that often arises between Congress and the 
President.163  By asserting the political question doctrine, courts have 
been able to avoid a great many pressing legal questions on the grounds 
that some issues are best resolved by the political branches of govern-
ment.164   
Of course, there is another check on power: the ability of Ameri-
can citizens to vote out unfavorable governments.  If the political 
branches make a decision to go to war and the people do not wish to 
do so, the opportunity to rectify the matter is only an election away. 
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